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Abstract
In Deleuze, singularity replaces generality in the economy of
thought. A Deleuzian singularity is an event, but the notion
comprises the effectuation of the event into form. The triptych
émission–distribution–répartition itself distributes the dimensions of
the passage from form-giving event to topological morphology. The
Deleuzian concept of intensity allows thinking both pre-individuality
and the rhizomatic connection of singularities on the metaphysical
surface of structure. Reflections upon the philosophy of differential
calculus allow for a coherent scaffolding reaching from pre-individual
intensity to specific individuality, in the passage from transcendental
genesis to empirical morphogenesis. But if singularity as event is
intensive, singularity as determinant of morphology – and hence, of
structural metastability – is not. Although the differential scaffolding
covers both intensive difference and extensive equality, and so the two
sides of the notion of singularity, the concept of intensity remains slightly
displaced, rendering conceptually difficult not only the perception of
intensity, but also the contemplation of individual duration, if viewed in
the terms of genetic ‘indi-drama-different/ciation’. The essay concludes
that it is art that may let us consciously contemplate our pre-individual
differences.
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I.
In the work of Gilles Deleuze, the notion of ‘singularity’ is pivotal. It
supplants generality in the pre-conception (or ‘image’) of thought: what
is thought, is thought singularly (singularly, and so not generally); the
beginning of Différence et répétition states that ‘[i]f repetition exists, it
expresses at one and the same time a singularity against what is general
[contre le général], a universality against what is particular [contre la
particularité]’ (Deleuze 1997: 9).1 If the universal logically applies to all,
the particular applies to only some (in the sense of not-all), whereas the
singular applies to one, and only one, while the general, finally, applies
to some (only this time in the sense of not-one, but several). A logical,
and more basically a semiotical, square. Deleuze’s parti pris is in favour
of the entire axis of contraries (the universal vs. the singular), discarding
the relevance of the subcontraries (the general vs. the particular). But the
notion of singularity also serves to articulate the concept of repetition:
‘singularity’ pertains to what happens, that is: to the event.2 As an event,
the universal is once, and for all, while the singular is once, and for
one; in that sense, the universal, in Deleuze, is a singular repetition
which pertains to all.3 Now, what is repeated, in Deleuze, is different-in-
itself, so that ‘singularity’ must mean something different-in-itself, just as
difference-in-itself conversely has to be singular in order to be a positive
differing, and no negation.
When introduced, in Différence et répétition and in Logique du
sens, the notion of ‘singularity’ forms part of a triad, together
with ‘pre-individual’ and ‘impersonal’. This triad has its roots in
Deleuze’s critique, or rather transvaluation, of ‘the classical image
of thought’. Logique du sens seeks to inscribe Russell’s logic and
Husserl’s phenomenology in a ‘transcendental field’, which at one
and the same time constitutes their ultimate condition of possibility
and reduces the relative extent of their conceivable applicability by
greatly enlarging the world of which they speak, so that, like Peirce
(and thereby Kant) in the two books on cinema, they almost come
to look like interesting prolegomena to the study of Bergson. The
third series – ‘of the proposition’ – in turn denies that either of the
three ‘distinct relationships within the proposition’ (Deleuze 1973: 22),
‘signification’, ‘manifestation’ and ‘designation or indication’ (22), may
found the relationship of a proposition to the event which constitutes
its sense. ‘Signification’, or ‘the word’s relationship to universal or
general concepts’ (24), is unable to do this, since any logical concluding
which is done, on the one hand points to the actual designations or
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indications of the significations of the premisses (in Husserl’s terms,
they must not stay purely ‘formal’, but be ‘transcendental’, that is:
expressing the unitary ground of experience, and so presupposing the
community of meaning of the logical forms in question4), and on
the other hand multiplies their presupposed propositions ad infinitum.
However, ‘designation or indication’, indicating an ‘individuated’ (22;
Deleuze underlines) state of affairs, is only made possible by the
relationship of ‘manifestation’ (23), or the ‘relationship to the speaking
subject expressing itself’ (23). This is because there has to be a subject
which designates the state of affairs in question as equivalent to its
own beliefs about it (hence the notion of the subject’s ‘manifesting’ or
‘expressing’ itself). However, the form of the subject’s beliefs, as well
as the stability of their coincidence with the state of affairs in question,
both presuppose the (general) form of signification: this (signification)
is what I (manifestation) believe that (designation) to be. In short:
indication of individuated states of affairs presupposes meaning, as a
function of the ‘desires’ and ‘beliefs’ of the speaking subject passing
judgement on the identity of the object of designation,5 but this in turn
tacitly presupposes the self-identity of signification, in language (25–6),
taking us back, in logic, to actual designation. So we have come full
circle. Where Russell talks about the proposition’s ‘significance’ as ‘its
capacity for expressing a belief and for indicating a fact’, acquiring ‘the
latter through the former, and the former through the meanings of its
words’ (Russell 1966: 210), we see that Deleuze systematically dissolves
any such unequivocal logico-linguistic grounding of designation in
manifestation in signification. It may be that signification would be a
kind of ground in itself, but only inside of language. And as an ideal,
self-identical phenomenon, signification’s form falls under Deleuze’s
transvaluation of Husserlian notions in the same Logique du sens.
Following Sartre, and the Transcendance de l’Ego, the fourteenth
series – ‘of double causality’ – argues that the subject must ‘always be
constituted’ (Deleuze 1973: 132), rather than being itself constitutive
of anything.6 This presupposes an impersonal transcendental field,
constitutive of subjectivity, and of its representations. Now, as for the
possible forms of the conceptual representations constituted through this
field, both ‘generality’ and ‘universality’ only characterise (and Deleuze
underlines) ‘signified classes and objective properties’ (132), whereas any
‘designatable systems, individualised in an objective manner’ (132) only
refer to ‘subjective points of view that are themselves individuating and
designating’ (132). Finally, the ‘personal form’ of any transcendental
synthesis of apperception, performing the predications of generalities
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upon individual objects =X, or objects-whatever, is only characteristic
‘of a subject that manifests itself’ (132). So, to Deleuze, the vicious
circle of Russell’s logic is but a repetition of the too-extrinsic7 theatre
of possibilities in criticist and phenomenological representation, with
manifestation corresponding to the active synthesis in the personal form,
designation corresponding to the individual object =X of predication,
and signification corresponding to general predicates. To the author
of Logique du sens, this triple dead end of active personal synthesis,
individual objects-whatever and general predicates is the point where,
within the framework of a transcendental field, the ‘idea of singularities,
that is: of anti-generalities, which are, however, impersonal and pre-
individual, must [. . . ] serve as a hypothesis for the determination of this
domain and of its genetic power’ (133).
II.
But as there are, according to Deleuze, two sides to the event –what
is and what is not effectuated8 – there are also two sides to the notion
of singularity. This mutual difference corresponds to the one between
Aristotelian and Stoic logic, which Carlo Diano has proposed to resume
as the difference between ‘form’ and ‘event’ (cf. Diano 1994). As is
well known, the syllogism of Aristotle expresses the inherence of a
predicate in a subject, whereas the syllogism of the Stoics expresses
the connection of events: Prior Analytics thus start out by affirming
that if ‘human’ does not belong to some ‘animal’, it does not follow
that ‘animal’ does not belong to some ‘human’9 (all a question of
genera and species), while Cicero’s De fato, on the contrary, when
discussing divination – a practice favoured by the Stoics as a logic of
the interconnection of events – naturally advances a syllogism of the
event (De fato 12): ‘If someone is born while Sirius is rising, he will
not die at sea’ (Cicero 1968: 511).10 Deleuze of course subsumes form
under the event; we might translate ‘what is effectuated’ into ‘form’, and
‘what is not effectuated’ into ‘what is not form in the event’ (this is of
course a restrictive use of the term ‘form’; we could say ‘actual form’,
in reference to Deleuze’s distinction between actual and virtual). But
the notion of singularity serves precisely to unite those two: the pure,
should we say eventness or événementualité of singular repetition as
difference-in-itself on the one hand, and the form of the effectuated on
the other. This is why Deleuze’s notion of ‘singularity’, considered as
a technical term, unites traits from Gilbert Simondon’s explicitly anti-
Aristotelian conception of the singularness of the event of individuation
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or of individuation as an event – individuation being understood as
an act of information, that is, as the taking-shape or taking-form of
an individual –with traits from mathematical concepts of singularity,
notably Albert Lautman’s interpretations of work by Henri Poincaré. On
the side of the event, Simondon’s singularity is an event of information,
whereas on the side of form, the mathematicians’ singularity informs a
curve, being itself a point from which any arbitrarily close neighbouring
point differs qualitatively –meaning that the curve will alter its course in
the vicinity of such a singularity: if it went upward before reaching the
singular point (a turning-point), after having reached it, the curve may
go downward.
Simondon’s major point of departure is that the ‘hylemorphic scheme’
is insufficient as an explanation of the existence of real individuals. His
central contention – reiterated by Deleuze11 – is that the coming-about
of any entity equals the appearance of a metastable ‘phase of being’,
which constitutes its own, new ‘magnitude’ (ordre de grandeur). A given
portion of matter cannot enter into such a new individuation until it is
in a suitable energetic state; so its constituent individualities, of a given
magnitude, must be excited into a state of ‘internal resonance’ for a new
individuality of relatively higher magnitude, held together by potential
energy, to appear. This process of connecting given individualities
into a new individuality of a higher magnitude, Simondon labels
‘transduction’. Transduction in the Simondonian sense happens when
the material that will come to constitute a future individual alters its state
so that changes within that material no longer happen distributively, but
collectively. An illustrative example from Simondon is that of nuclear
fission: the chronologies of individual fissile nuclei stay independent of
each other until a critical mass is accumulated; when the probability
for the fission of a nucleus to provoke the fission of another reaches
one (1), the nuclei have reached a state of internal resonance; from
here on, the chronology and the topology of the whole become co-
extensive, ‘there is individuation, because there is an exchange between
the microphysical and the macrophysical level’ (Simondon 1996: 148).12
Both resonance and transduction have to do with the ‘pre-individual’ – or
phaseless – dimension of reality. It is because there is, in an individual, a
pre-individual, conditioning, potentiality which has not been exhausted
(its event has not been entirely effectuated, we could say with Deleuze),
that this individual may enter into a new individuation, on a higher
magnitude. So, any individual is essentially a relation, the relation of
individuation, between the magnitude of the pre-individual field of
resonance and the magnitude of the individual whose form results from
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a, literally pre-individual, transduction. ‘The individual, by its energetic
conditions of existence, is not only inside of its own limits; it constitutes
itself at the limit of itself and exists at the limit of itself; it comes out
of a singularity’ (Simondon 1996: 60). The notion of pre-individual13
singularity here denotes less the spatio-temporal point where something
that is neither the future individual nor its morphology – for instance,
the walls of a mould or the germ of a crystal –meets the portion
of matter that will enter into individuation, than the fact that such
a meeting actually takes place, under energetic conditions that will
actually lead to individuation. It includes the event of two orders of
magnitude entering into communication. And so, it contains first, the
notion that the morphology of the future individual can be traced back
to its topological limits, and second, the notion that these may again
be traced back to a set of singular encounters whose morphology is not
that of the individual-to-be – these encounters Logique du sens interprets
as events, drawing directly upon Stoicism. Talking of crystallisation,
Simondon states that its singularity may be ‘contained in a crystalline
germ’ (Simondon 1996: 76). The germ is to the crystal what the mould is
to the brick, points of departure for the topological in-formation of new
individuals. The former can only be considered pre-individual in relation
to the latter. But it is clearly the pre-individuality of the encounter whose
possibility is ‘contained’ here, as singularity. So, in Logique du sens’s
reiteration of Simondon’s economy of individuation, the singularity of
the encounter ‘subsists’ (Deleuze) ‘contained’ (Simondon) as the intensity
of becoming at the metaphysical surface that limits and in-forms a
portion of individualised matter, whose form it shapes through so many
qualitative (specific) traits (this surface corresponds to a set of points that
are singular with respect to neighbouring points of the body on the one
hand and of its surroundings on the other). In this sense, an individuality
according to Deleuze retains its pre-individuality through its qualitative
traits, that is: through its morphology. These traits express its intensive
becoming, implying the entirety of the pre-individual transcendental
field, both inside and outside (but those terms are not entirely meaningful
here) of the individual’s borders.
So, following Simondon, singularity is said of a form-giving event.
And having stated the necessity of making the hypothesis of singularities,
Deleuze goes on to speak of these as of ‘emissions’, which take
place (the French expression is: se font, se faire) ‘on an unconscious
surface’ (Deleuze 1973: 139) – this is in the fifteenth series, entitled ‘of
singularities’. He has just raised the question of the survol, or ‘overflight’,
exemplified by the way in which a military battle ‘overflies its own
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field’ (Deleuze 1973: 137). This is precisely an example of ‘meaning’,
according to Deleuze. So, meaning (as we move, whenever Deleuze is
talking about ‘survol’, within a Ruyerian conception14), as a field, is a
field of ‘emission’ and of ‘overflight’, and it is in this field en survol
that the emissions of singularities take place, while they are enjoying ‘an
immanent moveable principle of self-unification by nomad distribution
[distribution nomade]’ (Deleuze 1973: 139–40; Deleuze underlines). The
‘immanent self-unification’ is none other than the ‘overflight’ itself, and
the ‘distribution’ of course is the ‘emission’. Deleuze here equates the
term ‘émission’, which can only refer to an action or event (we are
excluding television shows), with the term ‘distribution’, which may
refer to an action or event or to its result indiscriminately. This of course
expresses the passage from event to form.
Transduction, we saw, was the co-extension of chronology, or
the event, and topology, or the form. Overflight, now, is the co-
extension of (un)consciousness and of its content, of (static) genesis
and of the matter in-formed. Contrary to phenomenological sensation-
of-shape, the Plotinian – and Bergsonian – leitmotiv of Ruyer’s and so
Deleuze’s notion of the ‘survol’ is none other than the coincidence of
production and contemplation.15 What Ruyer terms ‘absolute domains
of overflight’, and, correspondingly, ‘absolute surfaces’,16 are ideal
morphologies – or structures – inasmuch as these hold together in all
points without being held together by any localisable liaison. “‘I”’,
Ruyer says of the field of consciousness, ‘am in all places of my visual
field at one and the same time. There is no propagation by contiguity [de
proche en proche], no limit speed, for such a domain’ (Ruyer 1952: 99).
This point of view of contemplation Ruyer immediately inverts to
the corresponding point of view of production: all consciousness, he
states, is ‘primary consciousness, the form in itself of any organism,
and making but one with life’ (104) This is life, holding together and
forming, in-forming, what the authors of Mille plateaux would term
the extensive ‘strata’ of the world, while being itself, in Ruyer’s terms,
‘non-localisable’, or ‘trans-spatial’, and so in ‘a sort of “metaphysical”
transversal [transversale] to the [conscious] field as a whole’ (105).
So with the ‘overflight’, what is overflown is conceived as in its
heterogeneous multiplicity, like in Bergson’s ‘pure memory’ (Bergson
1997: 140, 142 and passim) or ‘past in general’ (148), where any two,
what we cannot term ‘points’, pass immediately into each other, through
each other, just like in Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome. The ‘overflight’
has the embedding and embedded, enveloping and enveloped, structure
of the event. ‘Every event extends itself over other events; and over
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itself other events extend themselves’ (Wahl 1932: 156), Jean Wahl
says of Whitehead’s conception of the event, which on this point is
indistinguishable from those of Bergson, Ruyer or Deleuze. Partes intra
partes.
What shares this structure (the word is used here in its broadest
sense) is both Bergsonian duration and Deleuzian intensity. Both say the
becoming of something, the becoming of an individuality, the becoming
of its qualities, and say this becoming as the genetic reality – foundation
or effondement – of what becomes. Deleuze’s concept of intensity serves
not least to clarify why there should not be too close an identification
of heterogeneous duration with quality, since to Deleuze, quality, as
something which is conceptually speaking identically repeatable, or
actual, does not by itself entail difference-in-itself. In Différence et
répétition’s chapter on the asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible, we
meet instead intensity as the residual or expressed difference beneath
extended magnitudes. It is here that we come upon Deleuze’s triple
definition of intensity. (1) Intensity is difference in itself, it ‘comprises
the unequal in itself’ (Deleuze 1997: 299); it subsists as expressed virtual
difference without actually ex-isting, even after this ‘fundamental or
original moment present in any quantity’ (299) has been equalised,
exteriorised in(to) an actual and expressing individuality. (2) Intensity
‘makes out of difference an object of affirmation’ (301); Deleuze here
takes up J.-H. Rosny (aîné)’s conception of intensity as a difference
composed of differences beyond any equality,17 stating that intensity, as
constructed in a difference between two series at least, affirms not only
the superior series, but also the inferior one: in a difference E –E′, the
series E′ intrinsically affirms itself and the series E; however, the series
E cannot by itself affirm the series E′, since E′ is extrinsic to E, from the
viewpoint of E; Deleuze finds the source of negation in this extrinsicity,
saying that negation simply is difference viewed ‘from below’ (303).
From this economy of differences implying differences, it follows that
(3) intensity is ‘an implied, enveloped, “embryonated” quantity’ (305),
E being itself a difference e – e′, and so on. It is this intrinsically enveloped
character of intensity which allows it to subsist virtually, and so to stay
pre-individual. But to let what is intensive stay pre-individual is to view
it as a perpetual foundational act. Intensity, then, becomes characteristic
of individuation. The couple intensity-individuation supplants Bergson’s
couple quality-duration, so that an intrinsically heterogeneous term,
denoting difference-in-itself, supplants an intrinsically homogeneous
term, denoting identity, and a term denoting an event supplants a
term denoting a stretch of time.18 Difference supplants metastability as
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a conceptual framework. Unifying the terminology, we may say that
the Deleuzian event perpetuates itself in the enduring overflight of a
body’s morphology as intensity. Again, the Aristotelian logic of form is
subsumed under the Stoic logic of the event. What holds them together
here is the enveloping-and-enveloped structure of Deleuzian intensity,
whose place may be that of self-identical form or merely relational
difference (the surface), but whose status is that of subsisting difference-
in-itself or absolute difference.
Speaking of the body in terms of intensity, we tacitly assume that
it is a singular body, and so we assume that it is not reducible to
its recognisable specific traits. Pre-individuality is a prerequisite to
singularity in Deleuze’s thought, precisely because the actual individual
is not de iure singular, but always a cluster of – conceptually speaking
identically repeatable – specific traits. It is only by determining the
individual through its pre-individual genesis that Deleuze attains its
singular (and not only its specific, qualitative) difference. ‘Singularity’, in
Deleuze, is never individual, it is the individual which, as the expression
of its singularities, transcends its individuality (or rather withdraws
into immanence from the transcendence of its individual extrinsicity).19
On the other hand, the process of ‘indi-drama-different/ciation’ (317)
amounts to the creation of ‘species’ and ‘parts’, that is: general and
individual entities. This is where the ideality of Deleuze’s surface is
capable of corresponding to that of Husserlian species.20
That is indeed how morphology in general and structure in particular
become susceptible of interpretation in Deleuzian terms.21 The passage,
or correspondence, again hinges on the notion of singularity. For in the
‘species’ and ‘parts’, ‘differential relationships [rapports différentiels]’
and ‘singularities’ actualise themselves, respectively, and inseparably,
as ‘the two traits of the Idea’ (cf. Deleuze 1997: 281). The differential
relationship might be between phonemes (b/p) or between subdivisions
of the embryo (ectoderm/endoderm/mesoderm). The singularity, then,
is at the onset of the subindividuation, or the differenciation, of the
phonemes or of the embryonic subdivisions. This is singularity as
event – or Deleuze’s Idea as ‘structure-event-sense’ (Deleuze 1997: 247).
Singularity as a mathematical notion intervenes when the singular event
is converted into general form. It is to this end that Deleuze turns to
differential calculus.
The notion which in Différence et répétition unites the conditions
of intensity and singularness (to not use the term ‘singularity’, which
Deleuze himself does not use when speaking of it) is the notion of
difference that Deleuze notes dx.22 The parallel issues of the individual
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as de iure singular, of identity as difference, of morphology as structure23
as well as of the event as an encounter of forces – all enter into the
Ideal Synthesis of Difference (chapter IV ofDifférence et répétition). The
Ideal Synthesis is meant to establish a passage from virtual differences-
in-themselves to actual individualities. An actual individuality is
determined both qualitatively and quantitatively: it has a complete
determination. To Deleuze, establishing such a complete determination
presupposes establishing a real determinability. And mathematically
speaking, Deleuze now equals the complete determination of an actual
individuality with the determination of the exact form of an integral
curve (that is: of the actual values of x and y for a given function).
And this real determinability of the curve-form as a whole, Deleuze
conceptually brings about through the real determinability of the curve’s
single points (whether these are technically speaking singular points
or not). These points, now, become determinable by virtue of the
reciprocal determination of the differential magnitudes dx, dy: the
differential relationship dx/dy determines a point on the integral curve.
To Deleuze, this relationship dx/dy must be born out of the encounter
of dx, and dy, as indeterminate differences-in-themselves. Russell’s
critiques notwithstanding,24 it not only holds good for Deleuze’s late
eighteenth century/early nineteenth century Wahlverwandtschaften that,
as Hermann Cohen puts it, ‘[t]he identity of intensive and infinitely small
magnitudes were a common assumption in Kant’s day and age’ (Cohen
1968: 57–8 (§18); Cohen underlines), but also that ‘the infinitesimal
number is by no means simply a mathematical number concept, but
it is reality that corresponds to it in the armature [équipement/Gerüst]
of knowledge’ (Cohen 2001: 605 [1918: 791]). This is why the form
of differential calculus can be of universal, and not only mathematical,
value to Deleuze.
In the ‘collage’ (Deleuze 1997: 4) that is Différence et répétition,
Deleuze famously convokes several lesser known philosophers of the
infinitesimal: Jean-Baptiste Bordas-Demoulin, Salomon Maimon and
Hoëne-Wronski, who are all brought to contribute to his conception
of the dx. It is Bordas who stresses that we are not bound by the
Newton/Leibniz alternative that deems dx either to be 0 or to have
a definite value.25 Instead, dx/dy indicates ‘both the universal and the
operation by which it has been found out [dégagé]’ (Bordas-Demoulin
1843: II, 171). Bordas states that 0/0 in an equation 0/0 =y/a –x
(corresponding to, but not being conceptually identical to dx/dy in the
parallel equation dx/dy =y/a – x), ‘indicates the exclusion of that which
individualised the function’; what is left is ‘what is permanent in the
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function’ (II, 170). So the function is deindividualised; what is left is
what is universal to the function (its form, as reciprocal relationship).
For 0/0 as a symbol of indetermination ‘is indeterminate only apparently;
since it is the trace of the passage from the consideration of the
individual to the consideration of the universal, it implicitly represents
the latter’ (II, 170). Whereby we arrive at dx as the symbol of what
is universal – once, and for all – in the generation of what is individual.
And this something which is neither an individuality nor a zero, Deleuze
seems to tacitly extrapolate, is a becoming. When it is not universal in
the sense that it is once, and for all concerned, it is singular: once, and
for one multiplicity. ‘Below the universal there are plays of singularities,
emissions of singularities’, Deleuze states in Foucault, and the ‘only case
where the universal is said at the same time as the utterance appears, is in
mathematics, because there, the “threshold of formalisation” coincides
with the threshold of appearance’ (Deleuze 1986: 96). But dx, as a
symbol of intrinsic genesis, is not restricted to mathematics. In Maimon,
Deleuze finds a more comprehensive account of dx – the differential – as
a factor of ontogenesis: dx is neither an Idea of Reason (Vernunftidee),
nor a Concept of Understanding (Verstandesbegriff), but an Idea of
Understanding (Verstandesidee), pertaining to what are real objects that
are simply not really constructible in sensible intuition.26 The Idea, here,
passes into the sensible without passing into measurable exactness; these
ideal differentials are the noumena of phenomena, their conceptual role
being to explain how phenomena come about [entstehen] (Maimon
2004: 23 [1790: 32]). ‘The particular [besonderes] rule of the coming-
about [Entstehung] of an object, or the species [Art] of its differential
makes it a particular [besonderes] object’ (2004: 24 [1790: 33]).
So according to the Versuch über die Tranzendentalphilosophie,
too, the differential yields formal specificity – just as the ‘reciprocal
determination’ or the ‘differential relationships’ of Différence et
répétition yield ‘real determinability’ and ‘species’.27 Finally, Wronski
is summoned to supply a principle of complete determination, through
the element of ‘pure potentiality’ (Deleuze 1997: 226). To Wronski,
mathematics or ‘Algorithmics’ (Algorithmie) is essentially about ‘THE
GENERATION OF QUANTITIES FOLLOWING CERTAIN LAWS’
(Wronski 1815: 2). Quantity as such is either ‘real’ and ‘finite’,
and ‘somehow the matter [matière] of Algorithmics’ (2) – and is then
produced by Understanding in a ‘discontinuous summation’; or else
quantity is ‘indefinite’ – and is then used by Reason to establish ‘an
ideal liaison in finite or real quantity’, ‘shaping’ it or providing its
‘form’, in continuous ‘INDEFINITE TRANSITION’ (2). This, as René
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Thom would say, aporie fondatrice (we recognise in passing the duality
between ‘parts’ and ‘species’) is overcome by uniting discontinuous
summation with indefinite transition, showing the latter to be generated
through the former (quantity, obtainable by summation, was, after
all, the ‘matter’ itself of ‘algorithmic generation’). Now, this is the
importance of series to Wronski: ‘any function F (x + i) necessarily
implies GRADUATION’28 whose influence upon the generation of
quantities simply ‘is what is called function’; and graduation ‘constitutes
nothing but indefinite transition or continuity in quantities’ (6); yet,
the function’s Taylor series will present it as the sum of an infinite
number of differential terms.29 The idea – ‘dx, that is the idea’ (Deleuze
1997: 222) – stays regulatory, but generative. What is more, as any
variable x may itself be taken as F (y + i), any variable y as F (z + i),
and so on (Wronski 1815: 7ff.), the quantities involved can all be
generated through sums of infinite series. So dx in Wronski can come to
express for Deleuze the pure potentiality of generating actual, completely
determined quantities, determinable through series enveloped in series,
potentialities enveloped in potentialities. In this view, it becomes clear
how dx can be the symbol of the possibility of unfolding something
intensively enfolded, the point of articulation where the transcendental
field is subject to its conversion into empirical objects.
Deleuze’s account of the philosophy of the differential thus allows
for pre-individual intensity (dx) to be converted into specificity (dx/dy)
and individuality (x, y); and since intensity is by itself ‘embryonated’,
we may assume that it ‘subsists’ (to use a Deleuzian phrasing) in the
‘specific parts’, if we assume with Logique du sens that this intensity is a
surface, which is neither the portion of matter that is the individual part,
nor its own specific form. So, speaking of individual form in terms of
differential calculus ipso facto allows treating it in terms of an intensity
whose own structure (this word again used in a broad sense) corresponds
to that of the event: embryonation, overflight, rhizomatics. And this
Deleuze does. And this is where singularities in a mathematical sense
can be found.
III.
Through Albert Lautman, Deleuze repeatedly quotes Henri Poincaré’s
classification of the forms of curves defined by differential equations. In
his four 1881–6 papers entitledMémoire sur les courbes définies par une
équation différentielle (Poincaré 1993), Poincaré shows how it is possible
to globally determine curve-forms from their form in the vicinity of their
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singular points. Parting from the cyclical or spiral-formed curves that are
traceable on a sphere, Poincaré begins by listing four types of singular
points: the saddle-point (col), where two, and only two cycles intersect;
the focus (foyer), point of origin of a spiral curve, and which a point
moving along that curve will approach indefinitely; the centre (centre),
a point which is the summit of a topographical system;30 and finally the
knot (nœud), where an infinity of cycles intersect.31
References to precisely these four types of singular points are to be
found in several instances. In the ninth series of Logique du sens – ‘of
the problematical’ – the logico-paradoxical persons of Carroll’s tales (the
coincidence going for a walk with an accident) make Deleuze remind us
that:
psychological or moral persons, too, are made out of pre-personal
singularities, and that their sentiments, their pathos, constitute themselves
in the neighbourhood [voisinage] of these singularities, sensitive [sensibles]
points of turning-back-crisis [de crise de rebroussement], of ebullition [or
boiling points: d’ébullition], knots and foci (for example what Carroll calls
plain anger,32 or right anger33). (Deleuze 1973: 78)
Likewise, Foucault, labelling Foucault’s modus operandi a ‘[s]erial
method, based on singularities and curves’ (Deleuze 1986: 29), draws
upon Poincaré’s classification, and so tacitly inscribes Foucault’s
analyses within the framework of Différence et répétition, when
stating that a Foucauldian diagram of forces not only comprises the
singularities of power corresponding to its relationships (rapports), but
also ‘singularities of resistance, such “points, knots, foci” which in
turn effectuate themselves on the strata, but in such a way as to make
change possible’ (95). Deleuze indeed concludes that the (Foucauldian)
utterance [énoncé] ‘is the curve that unites the singular points’ (85),
whereas the singular points themselves are the ‘outside [dehors] of the
utterance’ (85). That resistance is first then comes to signify that actual
relations of power are completely a matter of already traced curves,
while new singularities may always arrive in emissions on the non-
given ‘outside’, affecting the global shape of the curve from their local
positions, or indeed making traceable a new curve, passing through other
neighbourhoods, and having a qualitatively new configuration.
The fifteenth series – ‘of singularities’ – also quotes these four types:
‘we know the existence and distribution [the French word here is not
distribution, but répartition] of the singular points before we know their
nature (saddle-points, knots, foci, centres . . . )’ (Deleuze 1973: 142),
citing Lautman’s posthumous Le problème du temps (Lautman 1946)
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in a footnote. Lautman precisely lists the four types from Poincaré’s
Mémoire, and then goes on to comment:
The existence and distribution [répartition] of singularities are notions that
are relative to the vector field defined by the differential equation; the form
of the integral curves is relative to the solution of this equation. The two
problems [the distribution-répartition of singularities, the form of the curve]
are surely complementary, since the nature of the singularities of the field
is defined by the form of the curve in their neighbourhood [voisinage]; it is
nevertheless true that the vector field on the one hand, the integral curves on
the other hand are two essentially distinct mathematical realities. (Lautman
1946: 42, qtd in Deleuze 1973: 142, n.4)
This difference – in Lautman, the difference between Ideas that are
problems, such as whole/part, continuous/discreet and essence/
existence,34 heirs to the Kantian antinomies, and ‘notions relative to
the concrete [notions relatives au concret]’ (Lautman 1939: 8), such
as actual mathematical concepts – is crucial to Deleuze. It contributes
to founding the distinction between the virtual Idea, problematic
and dialectic differentiation, and actual individualities, extrinsically
prehensible in their phenomenology. Through the singularities’
belonging to the problematic transcendental field – problematic not only
in the sense of mathematical problems, but like with Lautman in the
Kantian sense of problematic judgements as well – this field, together
with the indetermination it carries along with it, can be given ‘a fully
objective definition’ (Deleuze 1973: 142), precisely because the quality
of the singularities (saddle-point, focus, centre, knot) can be made out
to depend on one instance (the integral curves), and their existence and
distribution-répartition on another (the vector field).
In Différence et répétition, the same Lautmano-Poincaréan example
is connected to a parallel discussion of problematics. It is put forth
right after Deleuze’s saying that by speaking of “‘the conditions of the
problem”, Carnot opened a road for metaphysics which spilled out over
the limits of his theory’ (Deleuze 1997: 229), and his saying that Leibniz
had shown calculus to be l’instrument d’une combinatorique, expressing
problems that could not have been posed before:
No doubt the specification of singular points (for example saddle-points,
knots, foci, centres) can only come about through the form of the integral
curves which refer to the solutions of the differential equation. Nonetheless,
there is a complete determination concerning the existence and distribution
[répartition] of these points, which depends upon an entirely different
instance, namely the vector field defined by the equation itself. (Deleuze 1997:
229–30)
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This emphasis upon an autonomy of singularities which resides
in their ‘existence and distribution’ (or to put it otherwise: in
their distribution, as action and result) leads forward to Deleuze’s
asymmetrical distinction between (virtual) determining problems and
(actual) determined solutions, as well as to the affirmation that
‘[p]roblems are always dialectic’ (Deleuze 1997: 232). Problems, or
Ideas, in a metaphysics of combinations of singularities (Leibniz),
beyond or rather upstream from (en aval de) mechanistic, deterministic,
interaction (Carnot).
Indeed, two other central aspects of Lautman’s thinking, which
are contained in Deleuze’s use of differential calculus as a universal35
philosophical model, are the notions that finality in mathematics may
be a universal model for (self-)organisation, and that mathematical
coming-into-existence of concrete notions out of dialectic Ideas may be
viewed as a universal model for concrete coming-into-existence out of
dialectic Ideas.
Lautman states that ‘the organising action of a structure upon its
elements’, or ‘the solidarity of [a] whole’ – exactly the problems that
Kant had to leave outside of the realm of determining judgements in the
third Critique, we may add – become intelligible in mathematics, without
any ‘naïve anthropomorphism’ or ‘mysterious obscurity’ (Lautman
1938: 29). The question of structure in biology and sociology – to
Lautman, I think, these must include any symbolic structure, and so
coincide with Ruyer’s ‘absolute domains of meaning’ – now becomes
thinkable on the mode of mathematics. Concerning this ‘global’
structuring of ‘local’ elements, Lautman later on emphasises precisely
the example of Poincaré’s study of the global characteristics of
a(n analytical) function through its singular points (135–9).36 The
mathematical model may direct the action of thought in other areas
as well, not because of any concrete applicability as a quantitative
model, and not only because of its possible applicability by analogy
as a qualitative model (although, since we are dealing with the
foundation and coming-into-existence of qualities, this may not be
unimportant), but as a genetic model, converting a virtual Idea which
cannot enter into existence as is (since it is in itself dialectical, and so
transcends any field of compossibility, to speak in Leibnizian terms),
into actually existent notions – or, in other fields, individualities. And
Lautman concludes his brief discussion of the similarities between
his own dialectic genesis and Heidegger’s ontological difference:
‘Thus mathematics play, vis-à-vis the other domains of embodiment
[incarnation], physical reality, social reality, human reality, the role of
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models where to observe [où observer] how things come into existence’
(Lautman 1939: 12).37
In Deleuze, the emission of singularities thus corresponds to the
constitution of a vector field of a given form: a (re)distribution of
forces that brings about new real possibilities of form. Considered as
an empirical vector field, all points will, however, be quantitatively and
qualitatively determinable (this is the case for Lautman’s discussion
of the duality field/curve). But the strength of Lautman’s general
interpretation of mathematics, fromDeleuze’s viewpoint, is that it allows
for a problematic genetic ideality to subsist in the concrete mathematical
notions that can be asserted. Combined with Bordas’s notion that
there is a residue from the grounding of form, outside of clear and
distinct form itself, and of which the dx of calculus is a sign, intensity
in Deleuze comes to be noted dx and is identified at one and the
same time with the real determinability (Maimon) of Lautman’s vector
points, and with the problematic status of his genetic ideas. So, Deleuze
connects the event to form or morphology, thinking its unfolding from
transcendental genesis (distribution of singularities) to morphogenesis.
The term ‘heterogeneous multiplicity’ should now apply to both dx,
as intensity, to the event, as connection of intensities, and to form
(structure), as overflight.
IV.
We seem, however, only to know the decidedly pre-individual singular
intensities that are noted dx through the remarkable or singular, yet
individual, points as Poincaré or Thom classify them, and which can but
express the singularity-as-event that is the encounter of a multiplicity of
forces, dx, dy, dz, . . . 38 If we do not accept points as individualities,
the notion that complete determination equals knowledge of the exact
values of x and y would fall away. But to know, what is that? To sense,
we could say. Deleuze and Guattari develop the connection between
force, contraction and contemplation towards the end of Qu’est-ce que
la philosophie?:
So we search in vain for sensation so long as we stay with reactions and the
excitements they provoke: this is because the soul (or rather the force), as
Leibniz said, does nothing or does not act, but is only present, it preserves
[conserve]; contraction is not an action, but a pure passion which preserves
[conserve] the preceding one in the following one. Sensation is thus on
another plane than mechanisms, dynamisms, and finalities: it is a plane
of composition where sensation forms itself in contracting what composes
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it, and composing itself with other sensations which it contracts in turn.
Sensation is pure contemplation, for it is by contemplation that one contracts,
contemplating oneself as [à mesure que] one contemplates the elements from
which one proceeds. (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 199–200)
The soul, or force. And force contracts, force senses, force senses forces
in contracting them. This we are able to think, but not directly to
perceive. Sensation is equalised in perception. Contemplation vanishes
in its object.
If we turn to the treatment of the question of singularities in the book
on Leibniz, we find four types of singularities: (1) as inflexions, maxima
or minima of a curve, ‘the point of inflexion which prolongs itself to
the neighbourhood of other singularities’; (2) as centres, ‘the curvature’s
centre on the concave side as it defines the viewpoints of the monad
following relations of perspective’; (3) as what is ‘remarkable, following
differential relationships which constitute perception in the monad’;39
and (4) as ‘singularities of extremum’ which no longer constitute a
‘reciprocal determination by differential relationships, but a complete
determination of the [material] object by maximum or minimum’.40
Now, the individual object (4) must be the name of the singularities
corresponding to the surface of an individuality as they in-form it
in individual ontogenesis. The perception in the monad (3) must be
the name of the relations of singularities corresponding to specific
form. The centres (2) must be the name of the singularness of an
absolute domain or field of overflight as such – as the trans-spatial
complement of a set of singularities (4) which give the spatio-
temporal coordinates of its individual portion of matter. The trouble
is what the absolute domain – our consciousness – is perceiving. ‘We
must understand literally, that is to say mathematically, that conscious
perception produces itself when at least two heterogeneous parts enter
into a differential relationship that determines a singularity’ (Deleuze
1988: 117). So the absolute domain is perception of specificity; and as
perception of specificity, it is also perception of an individual object.
Yet we never go beyond specific individual traits and their just as
specific configurations here. So, as the domain of a contraction, as (the
result of) an encounter of forces, the absolute domain, even though
it contemplates the forces written dx in Différence et répétition, only
perceives their expression in singularities, which must significantly be
described themselves in terms of already-individuated points capable
of bearing specificity. As points that can be noted x (or x, y, z . . . ),
the singular points of a curve, or the singular points constituting the
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surface of an individuality, are not such singular intensities (dx), but
correspond to specificating encounters (dx/dy). The singular points of
an individuality’s surface stay intensive in the role of informing it, while
they remain equalised in the role of specifying it.
It is true that the intensive differentials (dx, dy) can be viewed in
Deleuze as the multiple sensations underlying any specific perception
(dx/dy). But it remains a mystery exactly how these intensities may be
contemplated through any specificity (dx/dy), let alone by an individual
(x). Indeed, one ought to assume that a pre-individual intensity (dx) as a
sensing force would perceive a specificity (dx/dy) and contemplate itself!
If we look at any specific individual (x), its Ruyerian forme vraie would
of course be a contemplating intensity. But this we can say from the
viewpoint of enduring individuality (which in the Ideal Synthesis would
be noted x), without having recourse to either specificity (Ideal Synthesis:
dx/dy) or intensity as force (Ideal Synthesis: dx)! The crux of this
question is that we have to assume that the intensity of dx simply passes
into the specificity of dx/dy and into the individuality of x. Only the
aim of Deleuze’s differential scaffolding is to explain the disappearance
of intensity when equalised in actual specific individuality – as well as
to explain the subsistence of intensity beneath equalisation, but then
precisely in the form of dx! Although the notion of singularity allows
for the passage from event to form, it is still the concept of intensity that
would allow for the difference E –E′ corresponding to an individual (x)
to contemplate pre-individual difference e – e′ (dx). But in the economy
of Deleuzian intensity, there is no individual =x. The two scaffoldings
do not coincide.
Perhaps the books on cinema are not least working on a solution
as to how pre-individual forces may become sensible to the individual
consciousness. As dx, these could be shown to underlie individuality,
but as its unconscious, while as the ‘absolute domain’ of an individual,
intensity could not be conceptualised through the same pre-individual
notion dx (the individual’s intensity would rather be some kind of d[x]
or d[x, y, z . . . ]). Art, then, comes to take on a foundational role, as it
is called upon to provide the sensation of pre-individuality. We do not
see, in movies. We see the camera seeing. In doing so, we break free
from the interactive constraints of evolutionarily adapted perception.
When art mounts a plane of composition, it lets us sense sensing.41
We may perhaps sense ourselves as multiple sensation if we exteriorise
ourselves in work.42 This would let the regulatory problematic idea of
pre-individual forces, and of the evenemential singularities that relate
them, become sensible (art as the becoming-sensible of the idea). Hence
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the strategic importance of the repeated remarks that ‘we need reasons
for believing in this world’ (Deleuze 1985: 223), that ‘we need to
believe in this world’ (225). To believe in this world is to believe that
the phenomenal forms we perceive really express events capable of
concerning us.43 The leap of faith takes us from the individual point on
the integral curve to the pre-individual singularity it expresses, and from
intensity as pre-individual force to the contemplative self-enjoyment of
the singular individual in its absolute domain. It would allow us to
exclaim: ‘All is regular! and All is singular!’ (Deleuze 1988: 81).
Notes
1. Where nothing else is mentioned, all translations are mine.
2. Cf. ‘Singularities are ideal events’ (Deleuze 2002b: 13).
3. If the particular and the general do not simply fuse into one transcendental
illusion of identical plurality, then specificity –which is presented inDifférence et
répétition as the heir to generality (Deleuze 1997: 318) –would denote a singular
event concerning more than one individuation, while part/icularity would denote
the singular event concerning some individual part of an individual(ity) – see the
remarks on ‘differentiation’ giving birth to ‘qualities or species’ and ‘number and
parts’ (Deleuze 1997: 271).
4. See Husserl 1992b: §§89–91, notably.
5. See Deleuze 1973: 24, and the remarks on Descartes.
6. Sartre follows Husserl’s (phenomenological) belief in a ‘constituting
consciousness’ (Sartre 1965: 18). However, he sees no need for an ‘I’ [moi]
beyond the psychical and psycho-physical one that falls under the épochè as an
object, transcendent from consciousness itself. Placing a transcendental ‘I’ [Je] in
consciousness would only serve to install an opaque point of non-consciousness
within consciousness and so compromise its phenomenologically translucid
character (see Sartre 1965: 23–6). So, the content of the pseudo-Cogito, as
Sartre puts it, must be ‘there is consciousness of this chair’ rather than ‘I have
consciousness of this chair’ (37). The consequence is that the transcendental field
(of consciousness) becomes ‘impersonal’ or ‘prepersonal’, making thinkable an
‘absolutely impersonal consciousness’ (15).
7. Cf. Deleuze’s critique of (phenomenological) extrinsicity, for instance regarding
repetition (Deleuze 1997: 349–50). He also cites with approval (233) Jules
Vuillemin’s appraisal of the mathematician Abel; Abel’s ‘general method’ parts
from the most general relation or set of relations capable of determining a
property, then to consider the class of beings to which this property is to
be attributed, and finally – ‘analys[ing] these beings from a general viewpoint,
[. . . ] defin[ing] the relations to which their nature permit them to be subjected’
(Vuillemin 1993: 214) – to reveal incompatibilities and indicate the road towards
the discovery of new relations. Vuillemin translates Abel’s very Leibnizian
demand for an intrinsic determination of possibility in the concept, searching
from there for its applicability, into the language of the Critique of Pure Reason:
the limits of Reason’s ‘palace, rational Metaphysics’ (220) ought not to be
posed from the outside, from ‘a faculty exterior to reason, [that is:] sensible
intuition’ (220); on the contrary, it is, for instance, from ‘inside the concept
of infinity [l’infini] that it might perhaps be suitable to search for the reason
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why it is impossible to speculatively prove the existence of God’ (220). These
considerations Deleuze builds into his architecture of the Idea: the articulation of
a problem whose further differenciations end up by generating real possibilities
or real potentialities (as Peirce or Whitehead would say) which actualise as
empirical individualities.
8. Cf. the twenty-first series of Logique du sens, ‘of the event’: ‘on the one hand, the
part of the event that realises itself and fulfils itself [se réalise et s’accomplit]; on
the other hand, “the part of the event that its fulfilment cannot realise”’ (Deleuze
1973: 207).
9. Aristotle 2007: 21–2 (Prior Analytics 25a).
10. Signalled by Diano 1994: 14–15.
11. Deleuze published a review of Simondon’s 1964 thesis L’individu et sa genèse
physico-biologique (Simondon 1996) in 1966 (Deleuze 2002a). Différence et
répétition’s concept of ‘indi-drama-different/ciation’ takes Simondon as an
important point of departure. A footnote in the fifteenth series of Logique
du sens states: ‘All of Simondon’s book seems of great importance, because
it presents the first rationalised theory of the impersonal and pre-individual
singularities. It explicitly proposes itself to make a genesis of the living individual
and of the knowing subject from these singularities. Therefore it is a new
conception of the transcendental. And the five characteristics by which we try to
define the transcendental field: potential energy of the field, internal resonance
of the series, topological surface of the membranes, organisation of sense, status
of the problematic, are all analysed by Simondon. So much [Si bien] that the
content of this paragraph and of the following one [“of the ontological static
genesis”] depend closely upon this book, from which we only separate ourselves
by our [les] conclusions’ (Deleuze 1973: 141, n.3).
12. In the case of a brick, the transduction happens when the heat from burning
and the pressure from the mould cause the clay molecules to simultaneously
take on a collective individuality, held together by potential energy. If the
internal resonance is incomplete, the brick will crack in the burning process.
To Simondon and to Deleuze, living organisms are individualities that simply do
not cease the individuating process: theirs is a state of permanent transduction.
13. ‘Pre-individual’ recurs throughout Simondon 1996.
14. See for instance the crucial references to Raymond Ruyer on the question of
overflight in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 26 n.,
198, 201). See also Le pli (Deleuze 1988: 137ff.).
15. Cf. also the conclusion of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?: ‘To contemplate is to
create, the mystery of passive creation, sensation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991:
200), with its explicit reference to the third Ennead. Cf. also Deleuze 1997: 102:
‘Everything is contemplation!’
16. For both notions see Ruyer 1952: ch. IXff.
17. Rosny writes: ‘Since intensity already expresses a difference, it would be
necessary to better define what should be understood [entendre] by that, and
in particular to let it be understood [comprendre] that intensity cannot be
composed out of two homogeneous terms, but at least out of two series of
heterogeneous terms. Thus a difference of temperature or of potential would not
be comparable to a difference between two uniform levels, but to the difference
between two irregular levels, like for example the irregular summit of a mountain
and its no less irregular base’ (Rosny 1930: 67). Cf. also his statement that
‘probably, any (calculable) energy implies factors of the form E–E′, in which
E and E′ themselves hide factors of the form e – e′, and this indefinitely, for
we shall never attain an energetic quantity E that supposes no difference’ (6).
Cf. also Deleuze 2002b: 135.
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18. Duration in itself is to be heterogeneous in Bergson. As duration (and not
generation) of specific qualities, however, it does appear in the form of
measurable chronology (the colour of magenta existing in a hic et nunc that
stretches from T1 to T2), rather than a devenir. Deleuze here strives to avoid
any concepts that could also apply to the actually generated and to the extensive
(as opposed to the virtually generative and to the intensive).
19. Cf. the remark that ‘[t]his is the real definition of the individual: concentration,
accumulation, coincidence of a certain number of convergent pre-individual
singularities’ (Deleuze 1988: 84–5); trans-spatial coincidence of the parts in a
‘forme vraie’.
20. Cf. the well-known rhetorical question asked in the third series – ‘of the
proposition’ – of Logique du sens: whether phenomenology would be ‘that
rigorous science of surface-effects’ (Deleuze 1973: 32). Husserl’s ‘eidetic
singularities’ (Husserl 1992a: 30; Husserl underlines), as species infima, are still
specific differences, and so to Deleuze belong to the realm of effects, and not to
that of events.
21. Cf. the way in which ‘À quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?’ (Deleuze 2002c) is
parallel to Différence et répétition and to Logique du sens.
22. ‘We oppose dx to non-A, as the symbol of difference (Differenzphilosophie) to
that of contradiction – as difference in itself to negativity’ (Deleuze 1997: 221).
Cf. already the use of dx to conceptualise the will to power in Nietzsche et la
philosophie (Deleuze 1999: 57–8), including an indirect reference to Salomon
Maimon through Guéroult 1929.
23. ‘Structure is the reality of the virtual’ (Deleuze 1997: 270); ‘structure is
independent of a principle of identity’ (238).
24. Russell is wholly dismissive of Cohen’s interpretation of the infinitesimal, as he
is of the term ‘infinitesimal’ and of the notation dx/dy altogether (cf. Russell
2010: chs 39–41 (§§303–24); specifically for Cohen, cf. Russell 2010: 344ff.
(§§317ff.)). Deleuze’s remarks that ‘[y]ou need lots of truly philosophical
naïveté, and lots of drive’ and ‘[m]any philosophical riches, here, must not
be sacrificed to modern scientific technique’ (Deleuze 1997: 221) (on Bordas,
Maimon andWronski), together with his treatment of the modern interpretation
of the differential in terms of a limit as a matter of course (cf. Deleuze 1997:
223, 228–9), all tacitly serve to defuse Russell’s objections to the infinitesimal’s
having any relevance. Russell rejects both ‘the identification of the intensive
magnitude with the extensive infinitesimal’ (Russell 2010: 331 (§303)) and the
notion that ‘true infinitesimals [are] presupposed in limits’ (278 (§262)). Deleuze
does not disagree, but repudiates, with Bordas, Russell’s alternative – that dx
and dy be either zero, finite or mathematical fictions (cf. Russell 2010: 330
(§303)) – as he does by suggesting that ‘the other alternative, that of finite or
infinite representation’ (Deleuze 1997: 231) might also be dropped (tomber).
Becoming, in Deleuze, is to be neither finite nor infinite. And so a rigorous
exposition of differential philosophy in general must ‘not depend on the infinitely
small’ (Deleuze 1997: 221).
25. ‘If like Newton you oblige yourself to annihilate the differentials, there is nothing
left to consider; if, with Leibniz, you attribute to them a value, you ruin the
exactitude of calculus’ (Bordas-Demoulin 1843: II, 163–4).
26. Cf. on the example of asymptotes, Maimon 2004: 48, 202 [Maimon 1790:
79, 373].
27. Incidentally, it is Maimon who provides the armature ‘indeterminate-reciprocal
determination-complete determination’. As is well known, Maimon combines
Kant’s search for transcendental conditions with Hume’s rejection of synthetic
a priori judgements. Plato’s and Kant’s 7 + 5 =12 is only synthetic to
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the finite understanding; to an infinite one, Maimon says, it is analytic.
Complete determination now takes place – for the infinite understanding – ‘in
relation [Beziehung] to all possible relationships [Verhältnisse]’ (Maimon 2004:
52 [1790: 86]), relationships or Verhältnisse which in the French tradition
are rendered as reciprocal, cf. Martial Guéroult’s comment on the above
quote: ‘Reciprocal determination creates the singularity of things in infinite
understanding’ (Guéroult 1929: 77). As Maimon says, ‘understanding brings
out from the relationships [Verhältnisse] between these different differentials,
which are its objects, the relationship between the sensible objects that have
their source in them [aus ihnen entspringenden]’ (Maimon 2004: 23 [1790:
32]); the ‘differential relationships’ between the ‘singularities’ of Différence
et répétition likewise bring about the specific differences between individual
‘parts’. So, Maimon sums up, ‘the differential of any object in itself is, with
respect to intuition [Anschauung], =0, dx =0, dy =0 etc.; but their relations
[Verhältnisse] are not =0, but can be determinedly [bestimmt] indicated in
the intuitions that have their source in them [den aus Ihnen entspringenden
Anschauungen]’ (2004: 23 [1790: 32]). All in all, we get a genetics starting
from intensive differentials dx or dy, entering into relations which bring forth
an object which ends up completely determined in its individuality.
28. Wronski’s notion of ‘primitive elementary algorithms’ (Wronski 2010: 7)
connects the elevation to powers, the extraction of roots, and the four basic
arithmetical operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) to the
Kantian faculties of Reason, Understanding and Judgement. Addition and
subtraction are united into the algorithm ‘summation’ (sommation), which is
‘founded on the constitutive laws of understanding strictly speaking’ (6). Powers
and roots are united into the algorithm ‘graduation’ (graduation), which is
‘founded on the regulatory laws of reason’ (6). Finally, multiplication and
division, reunited into the algorithm ‘reproduction’ (réproduction), correspond
to ‘[t]he neutralisation of these two intellectual functions’ (6), and stand in
an essential relationship to ‘the faculty of judgement’ (7), as an intermediary
between Understanding and Reason.
29. Indefinite infinitesimals play a direct generative role in Wronski, operating a
passage from the realm of Reason to that of Understanding: ‘In effect, the finite
quantities and the indefinite quantities, that is to say, the infinitesimal quantities,
belong to two classes of knowledge [classes de connaissances], altogether
different and even heterogeneous: the finite quantities bear upon the objects of
our knowledge [les objets de nos connaissances], and the infinitesimal quantities
bear upon the generation itself of our knowledge [de nos connaissances]: so
that each of those two classes of knowledge [classes de connaissances] must
have its own laws’ (Wronski 1814: 35). To Wronski, finitude (le fini) and
infinity (l’infini), as ‘two altogether heterogeneous functions of our knowledge
[savoir]’ (4), are products of Understanding and Reason, respectively. This
means that the infinite is outside of time (as form of intuition), and so lies
outside of the realm of experience. To Wronski, it can only act as a regulatory
idea, and to do this must be subjected to ‘the conditions of time, through
the influence of JUDGEMENT’ (34). This transforms the idea of infinity into
the idea of indefiniteness (l’indéfini), introducing ‘ultimate unity or ultimate
signification, not into the object of knowledge [savoir], into being, but precisely
[bien] into the functions of knowledge [savoir] themselves, relative to knowledge
[connaissance] of quantity’ (34).
30. ‘If we trace on the sphere a system of cycles and polycycles [cycles presenting
double points] so that through each of the points of the sphere there passes one
cycle or one polycycle, and only one, except for some singular points through
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which no cycle passes, we shall say that this system of cycles is a topographical
system, because it is analogous to the system of level-curves of a terrain. The
double points of the polycycles are then analogous to saddle-points of this
terrain, the singular points through which no cycle passes are analogous to
the bottoms and to the summits of the terrain’ (Poincaré 1993: 383 (ch. I)) To
put it briefly, they are ‘mutually enveloping closed cycles enveloping the centre’
(Lautman 1946: 42).
31. See Poincaré 1993: chs I–IV.
32. In English in the text.
33. In English in the text.
34. See Lautman 1938: 149–50. Elsewhere, Lautman remarks that ‘the Ideas of
dialectical relations are affirmative of no liaison that in fact exists between
notions whatsoever. As “posed questions” they constitute but a problematics,
relative to eventual situations of the existing’ (Lautman 1939: 14).
35. What is not universal are the different ‘ordinal ideas’ (regional ontologies,
Husserl would say) which differentiate themselves differently; these ordinal ideas
vary according to ‘the nature of the elements and of the differential relationships:
a mathematical, a mathematical-physical, a chemical, a biological, a psychical,
a sociological, a linguistic Idea . . . ’ (Deleuze 1997: 242).
36. In Le problème du temps, too, Lautman takes up the question of finality in
mathematics (Lautman 1946: 45).
37. René Thom’s Catastrophe Theory (CT) attempts to fulfil Lautman’s programme.
It is a classification of singularities, embedding unstable curves in families
of stable curves. This leaves sets of degenerate critical points (points whose
neighbouring points are themselves critical), ‘catastrophe sets’, which form
interfaces between surrounding subsets in the spaces concerned. Each subset
is stable, because its curves share the same configuration of ordinary critical
points (maxima or minima): any arbitrarily small quantitative alteration will
entail no qualitative change. It is only in the vicinity of the catastrophe set that
qualitative change takes place, because there, any arbitrarily small quantitative
alteration will entail change. So CT conceptualises structural stability through
the possibility of passage between mutually different metastable qualities.
Since the morphology of a catastrophe set is unaltered, no matter how many
further variables are added to the equations, the ‘catastrophes’ may serve as
universal morphological stabilisations (cf. Thom 1975). As differential theories
of structure as topology, Thom’s and Deleuze’s mutually independent work
bears close resemblances, as Jean Petitot has stressed (Petitot-Cocorda 1985).
In a rare instance of his actually using the word ‘morphology’, Deleuze hails
Thom for giving the ‘elementary events’ (the so-called elementary catastrophes)
in a ‘morphology of the living’ (Deleuze 1988: 22).
38. One way to interpret dx is as a force; dx/dy is then an encounter of forces.
Mathematically speaking, a dx taken for itself would be nonsense: its ratio
essendi and its ratio cognoscendi are the same, namely the relationship dy/dx.
However, what Deleuze says of Nietzsche fuses the two as well: ‘every force
is [. . . ] in an essential relationship with another force’ (Deleuze 1999: 7). And
again, ‘[p]ower [puissance] (what Nietzsche calls “will to power” and Welles
“character”) is this power [or capacity, the French word is pouvoir] to affect and
to be affected, this relationship [rapport] of one force with another’ (Deleuze
1985: 182). Witness again the use of dx to conceptualise the will to power in
Deleuze 1999: 57–8.
39. (1), (2) and (3), see Deleuze 1988: 121.
40. (4) see Deleuze 1988: 135.
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41. For the logic of cinematographic perception, see Deleuze 1983; for art as a plane
of composition, see Deleuze and Guattari 1991.
42. In a vein that is not Deleuzian, Georges Poulet’s admirable essay, ‘Bergson, la
vision panoramique des mourants, la juxtaposition’ (Poulet 1982: 165–205),
discusses whether there can be talk of any kind of intellectual attention in the
case where, according to Bergson, renouncing one’s interest in the evolutionarily
adapted pragmatics of life leads to the panoramic view of one’s entire
life-span, when death approaches. Poulet precisely discusses this question, which
is analogous to ours, in connection with what we might call the becoming-
sensible of the singularities that determine an individual life (reprinted in
L’espace proustien (Poulet 1982), the essay is of course intended to shed light
on the process of rememoration in Proust).
43. Cf. the lament that ‘we do not even believe in the events that happen to us,
love, death, as if they only halfway concerned us’ (Deleuze 1985: 223). Deleuze
states: ‘Only belief in the world can connect [relier] man to what he sees and
hears’ (Deleuze 1985: 223).
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